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Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing Its Age? 
Mohsen Manesh*a 
Abstract 
Nearly thirty years ago, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court famously 
dictated that in certain transactions involving a “sale or change in 
control,” the fiduciary obligation of a corporation’s board of 
directors is simply to “get[] the best price for the stockholders.” 
Applying a novel remedial perspective to this iconic doctrine, in 
The Dwindling of Revlon, Professor Lyman Johnson and Robert 
Ricca argue that Revlon is today of diminishing significance. In 
the three decades since, the coauthors observe, corporate law has 
evolved around Revlon, dramatically limiting the remedial clout 
of the doctrine. In this Essay, I show how two recent Delaware 
Chancery Court decisions—Chen v. Howard-Andersen and In re 
Rural Metro—underscore the expansive reach of Revlon and, 
therefore, the limits of Johnson and Ricca’s thesis. Instead, I 
suggest the dwindling of Revlon, if it is indeed dwindling, may be 
best observed from what is happening outside the pressed edges of 
corporate law, where other competing bodies of business law have 
emerged rejecting Revlon’s fiduciary mandate. 
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I. Introduction 
In 1986, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.1 In Revlon, the court 
famously dictated that in certain transactions involving the “sale 
or change in control” of a corporation,2 the fiduciary obligation of 
the corporation’s board of directors is simply to “get[] the best 
price for the stockholders.”3 
In the years since Revlon was decided, the ruling has been a 
continual source of interest among scholars and practitioners, 
with subsequent judicial decisions interpreting the Revlon 
doctrine occasionally fanning the flames of fascination.4 Nearing 
                                                                                                     
 1. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The case was orally decided November 1, 
1985. The written opinion followed on March 13, 1986. 
 2. Although “sale or change of control” transactions are the most common 
types of transaction that trigger Revlon scrutiny, Revlon in fact also applies to 
two other categories of end-stage “break-up” transactions. See Arnold v. Soc’y for 
Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994) (delineating four specific 
transactional circumstances that trigger Revlon scrutiny).  
 3. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.  
 4. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in 
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006); Christopher M. Bruner, 
Good Faith in Revlon-Land, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 581 (2010); Ronald Gilson & 
Reiner Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37 (1990); 
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its thirtieth birthday, however, Revlon has been subject to a 
crescendo of intensified attention. Professor Bainbridge has 
sought to more clearly define the types of transactions triggering 
the doctrine, arguing that the Delaware Chancery Court has 
misconstrued the supreme court’s Revlon jurisprudence.5 I have 
countered Professor Bainbridge’s characterization of the high 
court’s precedents, defending the chancery court’s deft use of 
dictum to provide valuable guidance on the ill-defined boundaries 
of the doctrine.6 Meanwhile, Professor Gevurtz has advocated for 
eliminating Revlon, arguing the doctrine lacks a sound policy 
basis.7 In the opposite direction, Delaware Vice Chancellor Travis 
Laster has argued for the expansion of Revlon.8 Beyond “sale or 
change in control” transactions,9 the vice chancellor would have 
Revlon apply to all negotiated acquisitions.10  
Into this lively discussion step Professor Lyman Johnson and 
Robert Ricca with The Dwindling of Revlon,11 which takes a 
refreshingly new perspective on the doctrine. Focusing on 
remedies, the coauthors argue that corporate law has evolved 
around Revlon, dramatically diminishing the doctrine’s 
importance.12 Monetary damages require a plaintiff to meet an 
                                                                                                     
Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s Takeover 
Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994); Morgan White-Smith, Comment, 
Revisiting Revlon: Should Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers Depend on the Method of 
Payment?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1117 (2012); Richard Giovannelli, Note, Revisiting 
Revlon: The Rumors of its Demise Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 37 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1513 (1996); Case Note, Delaware Court of Chancery Imposes 
Revlon Duties on Board of Directors in Mixed Cash-Stock Strategic Merger, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1256 (2012).  
 5. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277 (2013). 
 6. See generally Mohsen Manesh, Defined by Dictum: The Geography of 
Revlon-Land in Cash and Mixed Consideration Transactions, 59 VILL. L. REV. 1 
(2014). 
 7. See generally Franklin Gevurtz, Removing Revlon, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1485 (2013). 
 8. See J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and 
What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 18 (2013).  
 9. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering 
Revlon scrutiny).  
 10. See Laster, supra note 8, at 53–54.  
 11. Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 167 (2013). 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 195 (describing Revlon as a doctrine of “diminished 
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impossibly difficult liability standard, and equitable relief, in the 
form of a pre-transaction injunction, is in practice seldom 
granted. Thus, as a remedial matter, the pair concludes Revlon is 
today an “insipid” doctrine.13 Questions about Revlon’s dictate 
and boundaries may subsist, “but the stakes are far smaller than 
many scholars, judges, and lawyers may fully appreciate.”14 
In this Essay, I show how recent Delaware Chancery Court 
decisions, published since The Dwindling of Revlon was written, 
underscore the expansive reach of Revlon and, therefore, the 
limits of Johnson and Ricca’s thesis. Instead, I humbly suggest 
the dwindling of Revlon, if it is indeed dwindling, may be best 
observed from what is happening outside of corporate law than 
what is happening within it.  
The balance of this Essay proceeds in three parts. In Part II, 
I outline the framework of Johnson and Ricca’s analysis and the 
limits to their claim of Revlon’s dwindling significance. I do so by 
highlighting the liability implications of Revlon for boards of 
directors and corporate officers, as well as for expert advisors 
that may aid and abet directors and officers in a Revlon violation. 
Then in Part III, I suggest that the pragmatic remedial 
perspective that Johnson and Ricca bring to the Revlon literature, 
while helpful for appreciating the doctrine’s evolution in the 
broader corporate law context, may be in fact the wrong 
perspective to take for evaluating Revlon’s contemporary 
relevance in corporate law and practice. Instead, I suggest that 
Revlon’s salience should be measured by its ex ante impact—
what Johnson and Ricca recognize to be Revlon’s “prophylactic 
effect” on board decisions.15 Taken from this perspective, Revlon’s 
core dictate seems vital rather than dwindling—so thoroughly 
accepted into corporate culture and practice that the doctrine 
seldom needs judicial enforcement. Nonetheless, I observe that, 
as an enforceable legal obligation, Revlon may be dwindling from 
another perspective—taken from outside of corporate law, where 
competing bodies of business law have emerged rejecting Revlon’s 
shareholder-focused fiduciary mandate. Finally, in Part IV, I 
                                                                                                     
relevance . . . in today’s M&A law”). 
 13. Id. at 222. 
 14. Id. at 173–74. 
 15. Id. at 216. 
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conclude briefly and commend the coauthors for their valuable 
contribution to the Revlon literature.  
II. The Reach of Revlon and the Limits of Exculpation 
Johnson and Ricca’s central thesis—“that there is little 
remedial clout” left to Revlon and, therefore, “[w]e should . . . stop 
regarding [it] as a robust doctrine”16—is built primarily upon two 
post-Revlon developments. First, on July 1, 1986, Delaware 
enacted § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(DGCL), enabling corporations to eliminate the liability of their 
directors for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care.17 Since the 
statutory change, virtually every corporation has adopted an 
exculpation provision in its corporate charter.18 Given the 
ubiquity of exculpation provisions, fiduciary breaches of the 
Revlon doctrine require a plaintiff-shareholder seeking monetary 
damages to show the defendant-directors acted in bad faith in 
breach of their unexculpable duty of loyalty.19 Yet, under the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s 2009 Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan20 
                                                                                                     
 16. Id. at 224. 
 17. See DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013); E. Norman Veasey, Jesse 
A. Finkelstein & C. Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-
Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 
399, 402 (1987) (“In essence, the new legislation permits a corporation, by a 
provision in its certificate of incorporation, to protect its directors from 
monetary liability for duty of care violations, i.e., liability for gross negligence.”). 
 18. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: 
Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provision, and the Race to the Bottom, 42 
IND. L. REV. 285, 285 (2009) (finding that all but one corporation in the Fortune 
100 have provisions eliminating liability for breaches of the fiduciary duty of 
care); Laster, supra note 8, at 52 (describing “corporations without exculpatory 
provisions in their charters” as “rare”). 
 19. In theory, a plaintiff-shareholder could also seek monetary damages 
against directors for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty where the directors 
faced a conflict of interests and approved a self-dealing transaction. But the 
presence of conflicted interests would alter the standard of judicial review from 
the enhanced scrutiny of Revlon to the more exacting scrutiny of entire fairness, 
making the conflict-of-interests scenario inapposite for Revlon analysis. See In 
re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 82 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Laster, 
V.C.) (explaining that enhanced scrutiny under Revlon applies in circumstances 
where there “are subtle structural and situational conflicts that do not rise to a 
level sufficient to trigger entire fairness review”). 
 20. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
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decision, bad faith requires “an extreme set of facts.”21 To 
establish bad faith, a plaintiff must show the defendant-directors 
were “intentionally disregarding their duties”—that “they 
knowingly and completely failed to undertake their 
responsibilities” to get the best price for the shareholders22—
which, the coauthors observe, is a “tough damages standard.”23  
With post-transaction monetary damages all but 
unobtainable, Revlon leaves only pre-transaction injunctions as 
an available remedy for plaintiff-shareholders. But, here, 
Johnson and Ricca observe a second significant post-Revlon 
development: In recent years, “Delaware courts . . . have been 
extremely reluctant to grant injunctive relief even when directors 
likely have breached their Revlon duties,”24 preferring instead to 
allow shareholders to vote on the challenged transaction.25  
Added together, the coauthors conclude, DGCL § 102(b)(7), 
Lyondell Chemical, and the chancery court’s reluctance to grant 
preliminary injunctions has meant that “as an ex post remedies 
matter, Revlon has dramatically faded in usefulness.”26 
Remedially impotent, today the doctrine survives as a mere 
aspirational standard, not as an enforceable legal duty.27 
While Johnson and Ricca’s account of post-Revlon 
developments provides a pragmatic perspective from which to 
appreciate Revlon in the broader corporate law landscape, recent 
case law also reveals important limitations to the coauthors’ 
larger thesis. This case law, decided since The Dwindling of 
                                                                                                     
 21. Id. at 243. 
 22. Id. at 243–44. 
 23. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 216. 
 24. Id. at 212.  
 25. See, e.g., Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 
2181518, at *21–24 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (Glasscock, V.C.); In re Delphi Fin. 
Grp. S’holder Litig., No. 7144–VCG, 2012 WL 729232, at *18–21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
6, 2012) (Glasscock, V.C.); In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 447–
52 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, C.); Laster, supra note 8, at 48–49 (observing that 
Delaware courts defer to stockholders’ decisions if stockholders are given 
adequate information to make a determination on the transaction). 
 26. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 215. 
 27. Id. at 174 (describing Revlon as a “possibly useful, but essentially 
nonenforceable, norm in the M&A setting”); id. at 217 (suggesting that rather 
than a “legally enforceable directive,” Revlon exists today as a “customarily 
adhered to but ultimately nonenforceable norm or mere aspirational standard”). 
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Revlon was written, illustrates in stark colors the continuing 
reach of Revlon. To understand why, it is useful to first outline 
the framework of the doctrine. 
A. The Reach of Revlon 
Building upon a substantial edifice of scholarship28 and 
precedent,29 the Delaware Chancery Court—led by Vice 
Chancellor Laster30—has in recent years sought to formalize the 
Revlon doctrine. The court has done so by attempting to 
harmonize nearly three decades of jurisprudence interpreting and 
applying the Delaware Supreme Court’s original 1986 decision. 
Emerging from these judicial efforts are two salient doctrinal 
facets. 
1. Enhanced Judicial Scrutiny and the Reasonableness Standard 
First, Revlon is an “enhanced” form of judicial scrutiny 
applied to board decisions,31 rather than a distinctive fiduciary 
duty of corporate directors.32 This enhanced scrutiny is an 
                                                                                                     
 28. See supra notes 4–11 (citing past and recent Revlon literature). 
 29. See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242–43 (Del. 2009); 
Paramount Comm. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43–48 (Del. 1994); In 
re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 595–96 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine, 
V.C.); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (Strine, V.C.); In re Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 999–
1001 (Del. Ch. 2005) (Strine, V.C.). 
 30. See Laster, supra note 8; see also Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 
648 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.); In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (Laster, V.C.); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 
(Del. Ch. 2011) (Laster, V.C.). It should be noted that Johnson and Ricca are 
clear in their disagreements with Vice Chancellor Laster’s views on certain 
facets of the Revlon doctrine. See, e.g., Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 210 
n.233. But to the extent the vice chancellor’s views are articulated in opinions of 
the Delaware Chancery Court, they must be treated as binding legal precedent.  
 31. See, e.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 682–83 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (Laster, V.C.) (“Revlon does not establish a specific set of conduct 
obligations . . . . Instead, Revlon is a standard of review . . . .”); Laster, supra 
note 8, at 6–7.  
 32. Although the doctrine arising from Revlon is sometimes referred to as 
“Revlon duties,” the so-called “duty” announced in Revlon “is not an independent 
duty, but rather a restatement of directors’ [foundational] duties of loyalty and 
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intermediate level of judicial review, more intrusive than the 
deferential business judgment rule that is usually accorded to 
board decisions made by independent, disinterested directors,33 
but less exacting than the entire fairness review applied to 
self-dealing transactions.34  
Under this tripartite framework, the business judgment rule 
is a form of rational basis review that affords boards tremendous 
deference.35 Applying a rationality standard, a court will sustain 
a challenged board decision as long as there is any rational 
explanation for how it advances the interests of the corporation.36 
At the other end of the spectrum, entire fairness is a form of strict 
scrutiny, in which a court gives no deference to a board’s 
                                                                                                     
care.” Koehler v. Netspend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at 
*10 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (Glasscock, V.C.). “Rather than changing the duties 
directors owe to stockholders, Revlon changes the level of [judicial] scrutiny” 
applied to board decisions. Id. at *11; accord Laster, supra note 8, at 25–33 
(noting that Revlon does not create a special duty for boards of directors to 
follow).  
 33. The Delaware Supreme Court has summarized the business judgment 
rule as the 
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be 
respected by the courts. 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citation omitted). 
 34. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“The 
requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on 
both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, 
sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”); Kahn v. M & F 
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (“[E]ntire fairness is the highest 
standard of review in corporate law.”). 
 35. See, e.g., In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (Strine, V.C.) (noting that the “business judgment rule review reflect[s] a 
policy of maximal deference to disinterested board decisionmaking”). 
 36. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del. 
1995) (“[T]he business judgment rule shields directors from personal liability if, 
upon review, the court concludes the directors’ decision can be attributed to any 
rational business purpose.”); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 
(Del. 1971) (“A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business 
judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any 
rational business purpose.”); Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598 (Strine, V.C.) (“In 
[the business judgment rule] context, the court merely looks to see whether the 
business decision made was rational in the sense of being one logical approach 
to advancing the corporation’s objectives.”).  
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decision.37 Under this form of de novo review, defendant-directors 
bear the burden of showing a challenged transaction was fair to 
the corporation, both in terms of process and substance.38  
In between business judgment rule deference and exacting 
entire fairness lies the enhanced judicial scrutiny of Revlon (and 
its companion decision, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.),39 
which applies an objective, reasonableness standard to board 
decisions.40 In the Revlon context, where a board has determined 
to pursue a transaction involving a “sale or change of control,”41 
the court examines the reasonableness of a board’s actions in 
seeking the best value available to shareholders.42 Actions or 
                                                                                                     
 37. See Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 597 (Strine, V.C.) (“[E]ntire fairness 
review reflect[s] a policy of extreme skepticism toward self-dealing 
decisions . . . .”).  
 38. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (“The concept of fairness has two basic 
aspects: fair dealing and fair price.”). 
 39. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Under the Unocal standard, the target board  
must carry its own initial two part burden:  
First, a reasonableness test, which is satisfied by a demonstration 
that the board of directors had reasonable grounds for believing that 
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed, and 
Second, a proportionality test, which is satisfied by a 
demonstration that the board of directors’ defensive response was 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995). Under the 
second prong of the Unocal test, the court engages “in a substantive review of 
the board’s defensive actions” asking whether the board’s actions “fell ‘within a 
range of reasonable responses to the threat’ posed.” Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. v. 
Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 92–93 (Del. Ch. 2011) (Chandler, C.) (quoting Unitrin, 
651 A.2d at 1367). 
 40. See, e.g., Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 597 (Strine, V.C.) (“[T]he Delaware 
Supreme Court’s Unocal and Revlon decisions adopted a middle ground [in 
which] the reviewing court has leeway to examine the reasonableness of the 
board’s actions under a standard that is more stringent than business judgment 
review and yet less severe than the entire fairness standard.”); Koehler v. 
Netspend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 
21, 2013) (Glasscock, V.C.) (“Revlon’s enhanced scrutiny is a ‘middle ground’ 
between deference to the board under the business judgment rule and 
skepticism toward the board under entire fairness review. Under this middle-
ground review, the directors have the burden of proving that they were fully 
informed and acted reasonably.”). 
 41. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering 
Revlon scrutiny).  
 42. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 
(Del. 1994) (observing that in the Revlon context, directors of a corporation 
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decisions that fall outside of the range of reasonableness are, 
under Revlon, a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the corporation 
and its shareholders.43  
Here, reasonableness has both a procedural and substantive 
component.44 Procedurally, the court inquires into “the 
reasonableness of ‘the decision making process employed by the 
directors, including the information on which the directors based 
their decision[s].’”45 Importantly, “there is no single blueprint”46 
or “judicially prescribed checklist of sale activities”47 that a board 
must follow in the Revlon context.48 Rather, “directors are 
generally free to select the path to value maximization, so long as 
they choose a reasonable route to get there.”49  
                                                                                                     
“have the obligation of acting reasonably to seek the transaction offering the 
best value reasonably available to the stockholders” (emphasis added)). As then-
Vice Chancellor Strine has explained it:  
Unlike the bare rationality standard applicable to garden-variety 
decisions subject to the business judgment rule, the Revlon standard 
contemplates a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the 
board’s decision-making process . . . . [T]his reasonableness review is 
more searching than rationality review . . . . Although the directors 
have a choice of means, they do not comply with their Revlon duties 
unless they undertake reasonable steps to get the best deal. 
In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 43. See In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 85 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (Laster, V.C.) (“A failure to satisfy the enhanced scrutiny standard, like a 
failure to satisfy the entire fairness standard, establishes the existence of a 
breach of duty.”); id at 89 (“The question [under enhanced Revlon scrutiny] is 
whether the Board’s actions fell within a range of reasonableness. If not, then 
the directors breached their fiduciary duties.”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 637 
A.2d at 45 (observing that, under Revlon enhanced scrutiny, courts “will 
determine if the directors’ decision was, on balance, within a range of 
reasonableness”). 
 44. See Robert T. Miller, Journeys in Revlon-Land with a Conflicted 
Financial Advisor: Del Monte and El Paso 5 (Univ. of Iowa Coll. of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-24, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2156488## (identifying the 
distinct procedural and substantive facets of Revlon’s reasonableness inquiry). 
 45. Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 673 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Laster, 
V.C.) (quoting Paramount  Commc’ns Inc., 637 A.2d at 45). 
 46. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989). 
 47. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192. 
 48. See Laster, supra note 8, at 20 (noting that directors do not need to 
perform specific judicially mandated actions to satisfy their duties under 
Revlon). 
 49. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 595–96 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
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Substantively, the court scrutinizes “the reasonableness of 
the directors’ action[s] in light of the circumstances then 
existing.”50 The key substantive question is “whether the 
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a 
board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court 
should not second-guess that choice even though it might have 
decided otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on 
the board's determination.”51  
2. Liability Standard for Monetary Damages 
Even when a court finds that directors subject to enhanced 
Revlon scrutiny breached their fiduciary duty by undertaking an 
unreasonable sale process, if what the plaintiff seeks in a lawsuit 
is monetary damages, then the court must make a second 
inquiry. This second inquiry is a consequence of DGCL § 102(b)(7) 
and the ubiquitous exculpation provisions found in corporate 
charters adopted pursuant to the statute.52 DGCL § 102(b)(7) 
enables corporations to eliminate director liability for breaches of 
the fiduciary duty of care, but not for breaches of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty or its subsidiary obligation of good faith.53  
Thus, when the court finds there has been a Revlon breach, 
the court must further determine the reason for the 
unreasonableness by the fiduciaries—whether it was an 
                                                                                                     
(Strine, V.C.); see also In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 705 (Del. Ch. 
2001) (Strine, V.C.) ([T]he court[’s] . . . task is to examine whether the directors 
have undertaken reasonable efforts . . . and not to determine whether the 
directors have performed flawlessly.”). 
 50. Chen, 87 A.3d at 673 (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC 
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994)). 
 51. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 
1994); see also In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. 
Ch. 2005) (Strine, V.C.) (“[T]he enhanced judicial review Revlon requires is not a 
license for law-trained courts to second-guess reasonable, but debatable, tactical 
choices that directors have made in good faith.”). 
 52. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013); see Stone ex rel. AmSouth 
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (stating that the duty of 
corporate directors to act in good faith “is a subsidiary element . . . of the 
fundamental duty of loyalty” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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exculpable breach of care or an unexculpable breach of loyalty.54 
If the board made unreasonable decisions as result of negligence 
or even gross negligence, then the directors are likely exculpated, 
despite a breach of the fiduciary duty of care.55 If, however, the 
board made unreasonable decisions as a result of conflicted 
interests or bad faith, then the directors may face personal 
liability.56  
Notably, this second inquiry under Revlon is only necessary if 
a plaintiff is seeking monetary damages from the corporation’s 
board of directors. DGCL § 102(b)(7) has no application when a 
plaintiff is seeking an equitable remedy, such as an injunction, 
rather than monetary damages.57 Unlike damages, a showing 
that a board’s actions in pursuing a Revlon transaction were 
unreasonable—for any reason—permits the court to grant an 
injunction.58  
                                                                                                     
 54. See, e.g., In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 85 (Del. 
Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.) (“[T]he existence of a breach of duty . . . ‘has only a 
crude and potentially misleading relationship to the liability of any particular 
fiduciary’ . . . [because an] ‘exculpatory charter provision would require an 
examination [of each director’s] state of mind, in order to determine whether 
they breached their duty of loyalty.’” (citation omitted)). As Vice Chancellor 
Laster has explained, “[Exculpation] does not equate to an implicit finding that 
the directors did not breach their duties. Directors whose actions fail to pass 
muster under the applicable standard of review have breached their fiduciary 
duties, even though they are not liable for damages when exculpation applies.” 
Id. at 86 (citation omitted). 
 55. See, e.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 685–86 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (Laster, V.C.) (granting summary judgment in favor of certain outside 
directors in a claim for damages because the alleged breach of Revlon implicated 
a breach of the directors’ exculpated fiduciary duty of care and not unexculpated 
duty of loyalty or good faith). 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 686–87 (denying summary judgment in favor of an 
inside director in a claim for damages because the alleged breach of Revlon 
implicated a breach of the inside director’s unexculpated duty of loyalty or good 
faith). 
 57. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013) (allowing a charter 
“provision eliminating . . . personal liability . . . for monetary damages” 
(emphasis added)); Veasey et al., supra note 17, at 403 (explaining that 
exculpation under DGCL § 102(b)(7) does not affect the availability of 
injunctions or recessions); Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 1544 (“[W]aivers of 
[monetary damages under DGCL § 102(b)(7)] do not apply to actions pursuing 
an injunction.”).  
 58. See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 836, 
844 (Del. Ch. 2011) (granting an injunction on the court’s preliminary finding 
that the board had conducted an unreasonable sale process without further 
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B. The Limits of Exculpation 
Having now traced the doctrinal outlines of Revlon and the 
implications of DGCL § 102(b)(7), we can explore the limits of 
Johnson and Ricca’s thesis of a dwindling doctrine. These limits 
track the limits of exculpation under DGCL § 102(b)(7). 
Specifically, exculpation does not protect bad faith directors, 
corporate officers, or corporate advisors such as investment banks 
or law firms. Moreover, as recent case law palpably 
demonstrates, these limits are consequential, not merely 
academic.  
1. Directors with Improper Motives 
As described above, even when a board conducts an 
unreasonable sale process, DGCL § 102(b)(7) shields directors 
from personal liability for any carelessness or even gross 
negligence despite the breach of fiduciary duty under Revlon.59 
But directors are not protected from personal liability for an 
unreasonable sale process that is the result of their bad faith60—a 
breach of the unexculpable fiduciary duty of loyalty.61 Johnson 
and Ricca, of course, recognize this good faith limitation to 
exculpation.62 Indeed, the pair crisply details the doctrinal 
evolution of the good faith concept under Delaware law,63 from 
                                                                                                     
judicial inquiry into whether the unreasonable process arose from a breach of 
fiduciary care or loyalty); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 
171, 199, 210 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same). Of course, to obtain a preliminary 
injunction before a transaction closes, a plaintiff also “must demonstrate: (1) a 
reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) that they will suffer 
irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue; and (3) that the balance of the 
equities favors the issuance of an injunction.” In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 
41 A.3d 432, 435 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 59. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 60. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013). 
 61. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 
(Del. 2006) (explaining that “the fiduciary duty violated by [bad faith] conduct is 
the duty of loyalty”). 
 62. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 207–11 (discussing the evolution 
of the good faith doctrine under Delaware law). 
 63. See id. 
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the Disney litigation,64 to Stone v. Ritter,65 and ultimately to 
Lyondell Chemical. But the coauthors focus upon only the latter 
decision’s import on the Revlon doctrine.  
Specifically, the coauthors interpret Lyondell Chemical to 
impose a demanding liability standard for bad faith in the Revlon 
context66—one in which defendant-directors will not be personally 
liable unless they “utterly failed to attempt to obtain the best sale 
price,” thus “intentionally disregarding their duties.”67 But the 
chancery court’s recent Chen v. Howard-Andersen68 decision 
reveals the problem with such an expansive interpretation of 
Lyondell Chemical. What Chen makes clear is that plaintiffs may 
show bad faith in other circumstances, much less stringent than 
Lyondell Chemical’s “utterly failed to attempt” standard that 
Johnson and Ricca emphasize in support of their dwindling 
thesis.  
Chen involved the acquisition of Occam Networks by Calix, 
both at the time publicly traded Delaware corporations, pursuant 
to a transaction in which Occam shareholders received 
consideration comprised of 49.6% cash and 50.4% stock in Calix.69 
Alleging, among other things, a bad faith breach of Revlon during 
the process leading up to the transaction, the plaintiffs, former 
shareholders of Occam, sought monetary damages against the 
defendants, former directors, and officers of Occam.70 In response, 
the defendants invoked Johnson and Ricca’s interpretation of 
                                                                                                     
 64. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); In 
re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 65. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 66. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 209 (“[T]he Lyondell opinion 
imposed a demanding liability standard for challenging director conduct in the 
Revlon setting.”). 
 67. See id. (“[D]irectors would be liable in the M&A setting, the [Lyondell] 
court observed, only ‘if they knowingly and completely failed to undertake their 
responsibilities.’ The appropriate judicial inquiry should thus be whether 
‘directors utterly failed to attempt to obtain the best sale price.’” (emphasis 
added) (quoting Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009))). 
 68. 87 A.3d 648 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.). 
 69. Id. at 667. Whether a transaction in which target shareholders receive 
a mix of cash and stock in a publicly traded acquirer would trigger Revlon 
scrutiny is itself a topic of debate. See Manesh, supra note 6, at 8–28 (discussing 
the issue).  
 70. Chen, 87 A.3d at 666–67. 
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Lyondell Chemical—that the plaintiffs’ Revlon claim must fail 
because, despite any flaws in the sale process, the plaintiffs 
cannot show that the Occam board “utterly failed to attempt to 
obtain the best sale price.”71 
Vice Chancellor Laster squarely rejected this broad 
construction of Lyondell Chemical.72 The Delaware Supreme 
Court’s earlier In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation73 
decision, the vice chancellor reminded, outlined a number of 
nonexclusive circumstances that may be characterized as bad 
faith.74 Lyondell Chemical’s “utterly failed” articulation 
addressed only one such circumstance: that involving an 
“intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s 
responsibilities” as a fiduciary.75 The Disney court, however, also 
noted other bad faith circumstances, including “where the 
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of 
advancing the best interests of the corporation”76—a facet of good 
faith also recognized by the subsequent Stone decision.77 To be 
sure, Johnson and Ricca identify this other facet of fiduciary good 
faith in their recounting of Disney and Stone.78 But the coauthors 
do not link it to the Revlon setting, focusing instead only upon 
Lyondell Chemical’s “utterly failed” scenario.79  
But the upshot of Chen is that the circumstances under 
which a plaintiff can show bad faith and, thus, seek monetary 
damages, are broader than Lyondell Chemical’s “utterly failed” 
scenario.80 Aside from showing that defendants consciously 
                                                                                                     
 71. See id. at 680 (quoting Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 
244 (Del. 2009)). 
 72. See id. at 680–84 (discussing Lyondell Chemical). 
 73. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  
 74. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 683 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 75. See id. (quoting Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 240 (Del. 
2009)). 
 76. Disney, 906 A.2d at 67. 
 77. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 
(Del. 2006). 
 78. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 208 (“[G]ood faith, according to 
[Chancellor] Chandler [in Disney], requires ‘honest of purpose [and acting] in 
the best interests . . . of the corporation.”). 
 79. See id. at 216 (“[T]he Lyondell opinion imposed a demanding liability 
standard for challenging director conduct in the Revlon setting.”). 
 80. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, CHEN V. HOWARD-ANDERSON: 
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disregarded their fiduciary duty to get the best price, plaintiffs 
may also establish bad faith by showing that defendants acted 
unreasonably due to an improper motive—“a purpose other than 
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.”81 
Unlike the “utterly failed” standard, the scope of this 
“improper motive” standard for bad faith is quite broad. Of 
course, a fiduciary may be improperly motivated by personal 
financial interests that come at the expense of the corporation.82 
But improper motives may also arise from beyond simple 
financial considerations. “[A] range of human motivations can 
inspire fiduciaries . . . to be less than faithful to their contextual 
duty to pursue the best value for the company’s stockholders.”83 
“Greed is not the only human emotion that can pull one from the 
path of propriety; so might hatred, lust, envy, revenge, . . . shame 
or pride. Indeed any human emotion may cause a director to 
place his own interests, preferences or appetites before the 
welfare of the corporation.”84  
                                                                                                     
DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY LIMITS SCOPE OF LYONDELL CHEM. CO. V. RYAN 
FOR BAD FAITH CLAIMS, (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Chen_v_Howar
dAnderson.pdf (“[Chen’s] expanded standard [for bad faith] raises the specter of 
more situations in which directors and officers will be found to have personal 
liability for their decisions in a change of control situation.”). 
 81. Chen v. Howard Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 684 (Del. Ch. 2014); accord, 
Disney, 906 A.2d at 67; Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. 8373–VCG, 2013 
WL 2181518, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (Glasscock, V.C.) (“Revlon requires 
the Court to look to the directors’ true intentions to determine if the directors 
have been motivated by the appropriate desires: i.e., to achieve the highest price 
reasonably available to the stockholders.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Chen, 87 A.3d at 686–87 (denying defendant-officers’ motion 
for summary judgment upon factual record suggesting the officers showed 
“favoritism towards Calix consistent with their personal financial interests”); In 
re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 188, 197 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(enjoining a transaction in which the target’s officers were permitted to drive 
the sale process despite the officers’ personal financial interests in favoring 
private equity bidders over strategic acquirers). 
 83. Chen, 87 A.3d at 684 (quoting In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 
A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, C.)).  
 84. Id. (quoting In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10389, 1989 
WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989); cf. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Chandler, C.) (observing in the context 
of Unocal enhanced scrutiny that “[h]uman judgment can be clouded by subtle 
influences like the prestige and perquisites of board membership, personal 
relationships with management, or animosity towards a bidder”). 
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Thus, while transactional circumstances implicating 
Lyondell Chemical’s “utterly failed” scenario may be rare in 
practice (and even hard to imagine in theory), directors may quite 
frequently be faced with improper motives, financial and 
nonfinancial, especially in the context of a “sale or change of 
control” transaction.85 To take one example, consider the Revlon 
case—the very genesis of the namesake doctrine. In Revlon, the 
high court expressed concern that “Revlon’s CEO, Michel 
Bergerac, rebuffed Pantry Pride’s acquisition overtures in part 
because of the ‘strong personal antipathy’ felt by Bergerac 
towards Pantry Pride’s CEO, Ron Perelman, who was an upstart 
from Philly and not someone whom the Supreme Court believed 
Bergerac wanted running his storied company.”86 
Recognizing the link between improper motives and the 
fiduciary duty of good faith, Chen thus significantly broadens the 
good faith limitation to director exculpation under DGCL 
§ 102(b)(7).87 Directors may be personally liable for monetary 
damages in a wide range of circumstances not covered by the 
Lyondell Chemical decision. The importance of this fact cannot be 
understated.88 Just ask the two Chen defendants who lost 
summary judgment and now face the specter of untold personal 
liability in a trial on the merits.89 Incidentally, those two 
defendants were officers, not just directors, of Occam—which 
segues into a second limitation of Johnson and Ricca’s dwindling 
thesis.  
2. Corporate Officers 
                                                                                                     
 85. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering 
Revlon scrutiny). 
 86. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 n.24 (Del. Ch. 
2012) (Strine, C.) (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 
506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986)); see In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 
A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005) (Strine, V.C.) (“Revlon itself . . . involved a sell-
side CEO whose disdain for a particular bidder seemed to taint his and his 
board’s ability to impartially seek the best value for their stockholders . . . .”).  
 87. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 88. Note also that a finding of bad faith on the part of a director or officer 
limits the availability of indemnification or, as a practical matter, D&O 
insurance. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2013). 
 89. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 685–86 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
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Leaving aside the import of Revlon for corporate directors, 
the doctrine has not dwindled at all for another set of fiduciaries: 
corporate officers. Few have written more on the fiduciary duties 
and potential personal liability of officers under corporate law 
than Professor Johnson.90 Indeed, Johnson and Ricca have 
together coauthored two separate articles on the subject.91 In The 
Dwindling of Revlon, however, the pair devotes only one sentence 
to officers.92 
The executive officers of a corporation often play central roles 
in the exploration, negotiation, and execution of a merger or 
acquisition.93 For example, in Chen, Occam’s chief executive 
officer (CEO) was a key liaison between Occam’s board and 
various potential merger partners.94 Occam’s chief financial 
officer (CFO) was likewise “intimately involved in the [sale] 
process.”95 In fact, by her own account, “she was the person 
‘running the deal’ for Occam.”96 
                                                                                                     
 90. See generally Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers 
Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105 (2009); Lyman Johnson, 
Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Officers (and Other 
Senior Agents), 63 BUS. LAW. 147 (2007); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, 
Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 
(2005); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment 
Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005). 
 91. See generally Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer 
Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 75 (2011); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, (Not) 
Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
663 (2007).  
 92. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 206 (“Thus, while corporate 
officers remain personally liable for duty of care breaches, directors generally 
face only injunctive and other equitable remedies for such breaches.”). 
 93. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 97–106 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (involving a transaction in which the target CEO was permitted to 
negotiate the terms of the merger with little supervision from the special 
committee of independent directors); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 
924 A.2d 171, 188, 197 (Del. Ch. 2007) (enjoining a transaction in which the 
targets executive officers were permitted to drive the sale process); Revlon, Inc. 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 176, 176 (Del. 1995) 
(describing the role of Revlon’s CEO in blocking an unwanted acquisition offer 
by Pantry Pride). 
 94. See Chen, 87 A.3d at 654–60. 
 95. Id. at 654. 
 96. Id.  
NEARING 30: IS REVLON SHOWING ITS AGE? 125 
As a legal matter, corporate officers generally owe the same 
fiduciary duties owed by directors.97 Applied to the mergers and 
acquisitions context, this means that to the extent a corporate 
officer “play[s] a role” in an unreasonable sale process, that officer 
may be personally liable under Revlon for breach of fiduciary 
duty.98 But unlike directors, the liability of officers cannot be 
exculpated under DGCL § 102(b)(7).99 The statute covers only 
directors.100 For corporate officers, Revlon retains its full remedial 
potency.101 
The absence of exculpation means that corporate officers may 
face personal liability under Revlon in a range of circumstances 
where a director may be otherwise protected. As noted above, an 
exculpated director will face personal liability only when she acts 
in bad faith by conducting an unreasonable sale process driven by 
improper personal motivations.102 By contrast, an unexculpated 
officer may face personal liability any time she participates in an 
unreasonable sale process, regardless of whether the officer was 
improperly motivated or just careless.103 Without exculpation, 
                                                                                                     
 97. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (holding that 
“officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care 
and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of 
directors”).  
 98. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 686–87 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(finding that an officer who “played a role in the sale process” may be subject to 
personal liability for fiduciary breach). 
 99. See Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709 n.37 (“Although legislatively possible, 
there currently is no statutory provision authorizing comparable exculpation of 
corporate officers.”); Veasey et al., supra note 17, at 403  
Section 102(b)(7) authorizes . . . [the] elimination of monetary 
liability only for directors’ actions as directors. It does not limit the 
liability of a director for actions taken in a capacity other than a 
director, such as that of an officer or a majority stockholder. Nor does 
it apply to officers, employees, or agents. 
 100. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013) (allowing a charter 
“provision eliminating . . . personal liability of a director” (emphasis added)). 
 101. To be sure, even though a corporation may not eliminate the liability of 
corporate officers for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care, corporations may 
still indemnify and insure officer liability under circumstances authorized by 
statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2013). 
 102. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 103. As Vice Chancellor Laster has explained,  
“[Where an] exculpatory provision does not apply, the fiduciary 
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any breach of Revlon’s reasonableness dictate—whether it is a 
breach of fiduciary care, loyalty, or good faith—can create 
personal liability for a corporate officer.104 
With respect to the fiduciary duty of care, the potential for 
officer liability in connection with an unreasonable sale process is 
exacerbated by the fact that under Delaware law it is uncertain 
what standard of judicial review applies to the fiduciary duty of 
care for corporate officers.105 In previous scholarship, Professor 
Johnson has argued that, with respect to corporate officers, a 
breach of the fiduciary duty of care should be established by a 
showing of ordinary negligence.106 Professor Lawrence 
Hamermesh and Gilchrist Sparks have countered that the same 
liability standard that applies to directors—gross negligence107—
ought to apply to officers as well.108 In Chen, Vice Chancellor 
Laster noted but expressly deferred on this question.109 Yet, the 
objective reasonableness standard applied by enhanced scrutiny 
strongly suggests that, at least in the Revlon context, an officer 
may breach her fiduciary duty of care (and therefore become 
subject to personal liability) through ordinary negligence110—a far 
                                                                                                     
analysis . . . stops with the application of the standard of review. 
From a doctrinal standpoint, [a court] need not proceed further and 
attempt to categorize the directors’ conduct under the headings of 
loyalty or care, nor need it assess the individual directors’ subjective 
motivations.” 
In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 89 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 104. See id. at 85 (Laster, V.C.) (“A failure to satisfy the enhanced scrutiny 
standard, like a failure to satisfy the entire fairness test, establishes the 
existence of a breach of duty.”); id. at 89 (“The question . . . is whether the 
Board’s actions fell within a range of reasonableness. If not, then the directors 
breached their fiduciary duties . . . .”). 
 105. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“A 
lively debate exists regarding the degree to which decisions by officers should be 
examined using the same standard of review developed for directors.”). 
 106. See generally Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment 
Rule, supra note 90. 
 107. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he 
standard of care applicable to a director’s duty of care . . . is . . . gross 
negligence.”).  
 108. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate 
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 865 (2005). 
 109. See Chen, 87 A.3d at 666 n.2. 
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less protective standard than the gross negligence threshold more 
commonly associated with the fiduciary duty of care.111  
Putting aside the questions (and concerns) raised by an 
officer’s fiduciary duty of care, the fiduciary duty of good faith, as 
interpreted by Chen,112 represents an even more significant 
liability risk for officers in Revlon cases. The liability risk stems 
from the distinct position of officers, as compared to directors, 
within a corporation, and improper personal considerations that 
can arise as a result of that position in the context of a sale or 
change of control transaction. “[T]he potential sale of a 
corporation has enormous implications for corporate 
managers.”113 Unlike part-time directors, officers are full-time 
employees of the corporation. As such, officers may derive 
significant financial compensation, perquisites, and professional 
prestige from their executive position, all of which could be 
jeopardized if the corporation is sold to the wrong buyer.114 Yet, 
these personal and financial considerations are precisely the type 
of improper motivations that courts seek to police under 
                                                                                                     
 110. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that, under 
Revlon enhanced scrutiny, any unreasonableness during a sale process 
establishes a breach of fiduciary duty). 
 111. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 206 (observing that the liability 
standard for directors for a breach of fiduciary duty of care under Delaware law 
is “gross negligence, which has been construed as essentially a recklessness 
standard”). 
 112. See supra notes 72–81 and accompanying text (discussing the Chen 
decision). 
 113. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(Strine, C.). 
 114. See Laster, supra note 8, at 12 (“Executives may have ‘an incentive to 
favor a particular bidder (or type of bidder),’ especially if ‘some bidders might 
desire to retain existing management or to provide them with future incentives 
while others might not.’” (quoting In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924 
A.2d 171, 188, 194 (Del. Ch. 2007))); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 15 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 715 (1989) (Allen, C.)  
There may be at work here a force more subtle than a desire to 
maintain a title or office in order to assure continued salary or 
prerequisites. Many people commit a huge portion of their lives to a 
single large-scale business organization. They derive their identity in 
part from that organization and feel that they contribute to the 
identity of the firm. 
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intermediate Revlon scrutiny.115 As Chief Justice Strine 
explained as a then-vice chancellor, 
The heightened scrutiny that applies in the Revlon (and 
Unocal) contexts are, in large measure, rooted in a 
concern that the board [or other corporate fiduciaries, 
like officers,] might harbor personal motivations in the 
sale context that differ from what is best for the 
corporation and its stockholders. Most traditionally, 
there is the danger that top corporate managers will 
resist a sale that might cost them their managerial posts, 
or prefer a sale to one industry rival rather than another 
for reasons having more to do with personal ego than 
with what is best for stockholders . . . .  
In a situation where heightened scrutiny applies, the 
predicate question of what the [corporate fiduciaries’] 
true motivation was comes into play. The court must 
take a nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that 
personal interests short of pure self-dealing have 
influenced the [fiduciaries] to block a bid or to steer a 
deal to one bidder rather than another.116 
Indeed, Chief Justice Strine has described the “paradigmatic 
context for a good Revlon claim” as one where “a supine board 
under the sway of an overweening CEO bent on a certain 
direction[] tilts the sale process for reasons inimical to the 
stockholders’ desire for the best price.”117  
Chen brings these points to bear in concrete fashion. In Chen, 
the chancery court granted summary judgment dismissing the 
Revlon claims made against Occam’s outside directors on the 
basis of the exculpatory provision found in the charter of the 
corporation.118 Although the court found that Occam had 
conducted an unreasonable sale process, there was no evidence 
that the outside directors were improperly motivated.119 At most, 
                                                                                                     
 115. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text (describing various 
improper motives that may implicate bad faith under Revlon). 
 116. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597–98 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(Strine, V.C.) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  
 117. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1002 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (Strine, V.C.) (emphasis added). 
 118. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 675–77 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(Laster, V.C.). 
 119. See id. at 685–86. 
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the outside directors acted in breach of their fiduciary duty of 
care, the liability for which was exculpated.120 
Nevertheless, the court allowed the plaintiff’s Revlon claims 
to proceed to trial against Occam’s CEO and CFO, the former of 
which also sat on the company’s board as an inside director.121 
Acting in their capacities as officers, the court noted that Occam’s 
“[e]xculpatory [p]rovision does not protect them.”122 Both officers, 
the court found, may have been improperly motivated by personal 
financial interests at the expense of pursuing maximum value for 
the shareholders.123 To support this conclusion, the court cited 
facts suggesting that during the sale process involving multiple 
potential acquirers, the CEO and CFO took actions favoring a 
bidder that had confirmed at the outset it would support certain 
change-of-control employee benefits payable to the pair.124  
While the Chen officers now face the prospect of personal 
liability because personal financial interests may have tainted 
their good faith decision-making, it is important to remember 
that Revlon’s reach extends beyond conflicting financial interests. 
Like directors, any “personal interests short of pure self-dealing” 
may taint an officer’s good faith,125 exposing them to Revlon 
liability. Recall, for example, the Revlon case and the “strong 
personal antipathy” felt by the Revlon CEO toward his 
counterpart at Pantry Pride.126 Together, Revlon and Chen thus 
                                                                                                     
 120. See id. at 685 (ruling that the outside directors “have demonstrated 
that they exclusively breached their duty of care, and the Exculpatory Provision 
bars any monetary damages award for such a breach”). 
 121. See id. at 686–87. 
 122. Id. at 686. 
 123. See id. at 687. 
 124. See id.; see also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 80, at 2 
(“[Chen] concludes that fairly routine change-in-control benefits available to an 
officer defendant were sufficient to raise triable issues of fact with respect to his 
proper motives.”). 
 125. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010); see 
also supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text (describing various improper 
motives that may implicate bad faith under Revlon).  
 126. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also In re Netsmart 
Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 188, 197 (Del. Ch. 2007) (enjoining a 
transaction in which the target’s special committee permitted the target’s CEO 
and other executive officers to drive the sale process despite the officers’ 
personal interest in continuing in their management positions and receiving 
future incentive compensation). 
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illustrate that in “sale or change of control” transactions, officers 
stand in a fundamentally different position than directors in 
regards to both motivations and exculpation. Given the very real 
liability risks for corporate officers, Revlon thus remains a critical 
legal obligation.  
3. Financial Advisors (and Other Aiders and Abettors)  
Like corporate officers, Johnson and Ricca’s thesis is cold 
comfort for other corporate participants left uncovered by the 
protective exculpatory shield of DGCL § 102(b)(7).127 Investment 
banks, for example, may not owe fiduciary duties directly to a 
corporate client, but these outside advisors may nevertheless be 
liable for monetary damages when they aid and abet the breach 
of a fiduciary duty by the directors or officers of a client 
corporation.128 Moreover, such liability may arise even when the 
fiduciaries themselves are exculpated from monetary liability for 
the underlying breach of duty.129 Johnson and Ricca scarcely 
consider the potential for secondary liability that corporate 
advisors may face for aiding and abetting a Revlon breach.130 The 
risk is real, however, especially for investment banks, given the 
many roles such institutions often play in corporate 
transactions.131  
                                                                                                     
 127. See In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 86 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (Laster, V.C.) (“The literal language of Section 102(b)(7) only covers 
directors; it does not extend to aiders and abettors.”). 
 128. Under Delaware law, a claim for aiding and abetting breaches of 
fiduciary duty has four elements: “(i) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, 
(ii) a breach of the fiduciary’s duty, (iii) knowing participation in the breach by 
the non-fiduciary defendants, and (iv) damages proximately caused by the 
breach.” Id. at 80. 
 129. See id. at 85–88 (ruling that the exculpation of a breach of fiduciary 
duty by a director is irrelevant to liability for aiding and abetting in that 
breach). 
 130. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 212 (noting the “conflicted 
financial advisor” involved in In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 
813 (Del. Ch. 2011)). 
 131. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and 
Chancellors 15–32 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper 
No. 14-23, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2446576 (describing the many roles played by investment bankers 
in corporate mergers and acquisitions and the conflicts created thereby).  
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Indeed, Delaware courts have long voiced concerns in the 
Revlon context about the conflicting interests of investment 
banks advising corporations in mergers and acquisitions. As early 
as 2005, then-Vice Chancellor Strine decried Credit Suisse First 
Boston, in dictum, for needlessly compromising its position as 
sell-side financial advisor to a target corporation by seeking to 
provide buy-side “staple” financing to the acquirer of the target.132 
Typical of Delaware jurisprudence, this dictum would resurface 
with more force in subsequent decisions.133 In this instance, it 
would come to bite in In re Rural Metro Corp. Shareholders 
Litigation.134 
In Rural Metro, after a trial on the merits, Vice Chancellor 
Laster held the investment bank RBC Capital Markets liable for 
aiding and abetting the board of Rural/Metro in breaching Revlon 
during a largely botched, and therefore unreasonable, sale 
process.135 The Rural/Metro board had hired RBC as financial 
advisor to explore strategic alternatives for the corporation.136 
Throughout its engagement as financial advisor, the court found, 
RBC took seemingly every opportunity to surreptitiously 
manipulate the Rural/Metro board to advance its own interests.137 
At the outset, RBC had coaxed the Rural/Metro board into an 
immediate sale in the hopes of exploiting the timing of the sale to 
provide acquisition financing in a separate, simultaneous 
transaction involving Rural/Metro’s chief competitor.138 Later in 
the sale process, aiming to generate more fees by providing buy-
side “staple” financing to Rural/Metro’s likely acquirer, RBC 
sought to curry favor with the bidder by sharing inside 
information about the Rural/Metro board’s private 
                                                                                                     
 132. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1005–06 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (Strine, V.C.). 
 133. See Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dictum: The Default Duty Debate in 
Delaware, 39 J. CORP. L. 35, 53–60 (2014) (describing the important roles of 
dictum in Delaware law). 
 134. 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.). 
 135. See id. at 63, 80–96. 
 136. Id. at 66–70. 
 137. See id. at 101 (“RBC’s self-interested manipulations caused the Rural 
process to unfold differently than it otherwise would have . . . . [B]ut for RBC’s 
actions, a fully-informed Board would have had numerous opportunities to 
achieve a superior result.”) 
 138. Id. at 66–68. 
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deliberations.139 Finally, on the day before the Rural/Metro board 
was set to vote, in an effort to sell Rural/Metro’s directors on the 
transaction, RBC manipulated its valuation analysis to make the 
final price offered appear more attractive.140 Finding that the 
Rural/Metro board’s sale process was unreasonable under Revlon, 
the chancery court had little trouble assigning liability to RBC for 
aiding and abetting the board in their bungled efforts.141  
The egregious facts in Rural Metro might tempt one to think 
such scenarios are uncommon. But, as Johnson and Ricca note in 
passing,142 Rural Metro is not the first instance of a 
self-interested investment bank deceptively meddling and, thus, 
sullying a client corporation’s Revlon sale process. As the 
chancery court has observed is a slightly different context, “the 
reality [is] that American business history is littered with 
examples of managers who exploited the opportunity to work 
both sides of a deal.”143 In 2011, the chancery court temporarily 
enjoined the sale of Del Monte Foods to a consortium of private 
equity buyers based on facts suggesting that the Del Monte 
board’s financial advisor, Barclays, had “secretly and selfishly 
manipulated the sale process to engineer a transaction that 
would permit Barclays to obtain lucrative buy-side financing 
fees.”144 And the next year, in a lawsuit brought to enjoin Kinder 
Morgan’s acquisition of El Paso Corporation, the chancery court 
sharply rebuked Goldman Sachs for similar self-interested 
mischief while it acted as financial advisor to the El Paso board of 
directors.145  
Admittedly, in neither of these high-profile cases did the 
court ultimately block the transaction or award damages, despite 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 76. 
 140. Id. at 76–78. 
 141. See id. at 103. 
 142. Supra note 130. 
 143. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(Strine, V.C.) 
 144. See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 817 (Del. 
Ch. 2011) (Laster, V.C.). 
 145. See In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(Strine, C.) (criticizing Goldman for “claim[ing] to step out of the [El Paso sale] 
process while failing to do so completely and while playing a key role in 
distorting the economic incentives of the bank that came in to ensure that 
Goldman’s conflict did not taint the [El Paso] Board’s deliberations”). 
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finding a reasonable probability that the plaintiff-shareholders 
could show at trial a breach of Revlon by the board of directors.146 
(Although, it should be noted that in both instances, the 
defendants settled the lawsuits with the plaintiffs for substantial 
sums.147) Still, what these and other cases demonstrate is that 
the investment banks that advise corporations in mergers and 
acquisitions are rife with their own conflicts of interests.148 To 
this picture, Rural Metro adds the stark detail that, while the 
courts may be chary to enjoin a transaction149 and directors are 
                                                                                                     
 146. See Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 844–45 (granting a temporary twenty-day 
injunction to allow time for any competing bids); El Paso, 41 A.3d at 434 
(denying preliminary injunction). 
 147. In the El Paso case, Kinder Morgan settled the lawsuit with the 
plaintiffs by agreeing to pay $110 million. In addition, Goldman Sachs agreed to 
forego $20 million that El Paso had promised to pay the investment firm in 
connection with the transaction. See Jef Feeley, Kinder Morgan to Pay $110 
Million to Settle El Paso Suit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-07/kinder-morgan-to-pay-110-million-
to-settle-el-paso-suits.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). In the Del Monte case, Del Monte and 
Barclays settled with the plaintiffs, paying them $89.4 million. See Gina Chon & 
Anupreeta Das, Settlement Chills Use of M&A Tactic, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203388804576614924170
701478 (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Significant settlements were also obtained in the two other cases that 
Johnson and Ricca cite, in which the chancery court found the plaintiffs’ Revlon 
claim stood a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits but nonetheless 
denied a preliminary injunction to block the challenged transaction. See 
Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 226–27. In the Delphi Financial Group case, 
the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff-shareholders $49 million. See Phil 
Medford & Jef Feeley, Delphi Financial Settles Investor Suit Over Tokio Deal, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2012, 2:16 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-
09/delphi-financial-settles-investor-suit-over-tokio-deal.html (last visited Oct. 3, 
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In the Koehler v. 
Netspend Holdings case, the defendants agreed to modify various deal 
protection provisions in the merger agreement before the shareholder vote and, 
further, pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys $2.2 million for their fees. See Koehler v. 
Netspend Holdings, Inc., No. 8373–VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch. May 21, 
2013). Such multi-million dollar sums go far to answer a question Johnson and 
Ricca raise: “Why [do plaintiffs’ attorneys] press cases where money damages 
and the granting of injunctive relief are so unlikely?” Johnson & Ricca, supra 
note 11, at 217. 
 148. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 131, at 15–32 (describing the many 
roles played by investment bankers in corporate mergers and acquisitions and 
the conflicts created thereby).  
 149. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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mostly protected by exculpation,150 the investment banks that 
knowingly advise or assist corporate boards in an unreasonable 
sales process may face harsh monetary sanctions for aiding and 
abetting a Revlon violation.  
The result in Rural Metro thus belies the claim that Revlon is 
a receding doctrine. Although damages are yet to be determined, 
RBC may be liable for as much as $250 million,151 for a 
transaction in which the investment bank received only $5.1 
million for its efforts.152 But the impact of Rural Metro is, of 
course, more far-reaching than that. The gross disproportion 
between the fees an investment bank may obtain for its services 
in a given transaction versus the potential liability it may face for 
aiding and abetting a fiduciary breach suggests that investment 
banks, and indeed all corporate advisors, will after Rural Metro 
more scrupulously monitor the sale process and the involvement 
of the corporate fiduciaries in order to avoid the potential for 
secondary liability.153 In this regard, by enlisting corporate 
advisors to ensure fiduciary compliance, Rural Metro reinforces 
the Revlon doctrine.154 
III. The Dwindling of Revlon? 
Despite the limits to exculpation described above, let us be 
clear: the reach of Revlon as an enforceable legal obligation 
should not be exaggerated. After all, in so-called Revlon-land, 
                                                                                                     
 150. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 151. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Ruling Highlights Unequal Treatment in 
Penalizing Corporate Wrongdoers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:45 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/ruling-highlights-unequal-treatment-in-
penalizing-corporate-wrongdoers/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2014) (estimating damages as much as $250 million) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Feeley, supra note 147 (“[T]he full damage 
award . . . could top $240 million with interest.”). 
 152. In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 69 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 153. See id. at 88–89 (describing the rationale behind and financial 
incentives created by “gatekeeper” liability). 
 154. See id. at 89 (“[T]he prospect of aiding and abetting liability for 
investment banks . . . creates a powerful financial reason for the banks 
to . . . advise boards in a manner that helps ensure that the directors carry out 
their fiduciary duties when exploring strategic alternatives and conducting a 
sale process . . . .”). 
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courts require fiduciaries to make only “reasonable, not perfect” 
decisions.155 Judges will not meticulously “second-guess [the] 
reasonable, but debatable, tactical choices that directors have 
made.”156 And even when a corporation conducts an unreasonable 
sale process, its directors at least will be likely exculpated for any 
carelessness or even gross negligence in the absence of bad 
faith.157 Moreover, personal liability for bad faith requires a court 
to find that the directors were “intentionally disregarding their 
duties”158 or, alternatively, acting on an “improper motive,”159 
which in either case is a difficult evidentiary burden. 
Thus, as Johnson and Ricca observe, in practice, courts 
almost never grant injunctions or award monetary damages in 
connection with a Revlon violation. Although cases like Chen and 
Rural Metro demonstrate starkly the limits of the coauthors’ 
thesis, these cases are not the typical Revlon cases. They are the 
exception. Indeed, the focus on non-director defendants in both 
Chen and Rural Metro may itself reflect the difficulty for 
plaintiff-shareholders to enforce Revlon against exculpated 
boards of directors. As a result, Johnson and Ricca are correct to 
conclude that from a remedial perspective, Revlon is of little 
pragmatic consequence.160  
But this too may overstate Revlon’s insignificance. The 
remedial perspective is likely the wrong perspective from which 
to judge Revlon’s continuing vigor. Instead, if one wants to truly 
see the dwindling of Revlon as an enforceable legal obligation, one 
must step outside of corporate law to appreciate the shrinking 
realm of the doctrine. 
                                                                                                     
 155. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009); accord 
Paramount Commc’ns. Inc. v. QVC, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (1994) (describing the 
judicial inquiry under Revlon as asking “whether the directors made a 
reasonable decision, not a perfect decision”). 
 156. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (2005) (Strine, 
V.C.). 
 157. See, e.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 685 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(ruling that the outside directors “have demonstrated that they exclusively 
breached their duty of care, and the Exculpatory Provision bars any monetary 
damages award for such a breach”). 
 158. Lyondell Chem., 970 A.2d at 243. 
 159. Chen, 87 A.3d at 685. 
 160. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 222 (“[W]e conclude . . . that 
there is little remedial clout to the Revlon doctrine in any setting.”). 
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A. Dwindling or Pervasive? 
To be sure, Johnson and Ricca’s chief contribution to the 
Revlon literature is the novel remedial perspective the pair brings 
to the doctrine.161 But the fact that courts seldom grant 
injunctions or monetary damages in connection with a Revlon 
claim does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is an 
“insipid” corporate law doctrine.162 In fact, rather than reveal the 
erosion of the doctrine, the lack of judicial enforcement may show 
the opposite: that Revlon, as a normative concern, is enduring 
and pervasive.  
To be specific, it may be the case that boards have 
fundamentally internalized Revlon’s core dictate—that directors’ 
sole fiduciary obligation is “to get[] the best price for the 
stockholders.”163 In an era of shareholder empowerment164 and 
intense investor activism,165 for better or worse, directors 
nowadays worship at the altar of shareholder value 
maximization.166 Indeed, that altar is today so sacred that when 
                                                                                                     
 161. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
 162. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 222. 
 163. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 176, 182 
(Del. 1995). 
 164. See, e.g., Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden 
Parachute Compensation, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9178, 76 Fed. Reg. 
6010, 6013 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249) (granting 
shareholders a nonbinding vote on certain executive compensation matters); 
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-
9136, 34-62764, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200, 232, 240 & 249) (granting shareholders proxy access). But see Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating portions 
of the 2010 shareholder proxy access rules).  
 165. See, e.g., SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN 
M&A TRANSACTIONS (2014), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-
fusion-existing-content/publications/pub1694.pdf (highlighting the recent role of 
shareholder activism in corporate mergers and acquisitions); Iman Anabtawi & 
Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 
1274–81 (2008) (charting the evolving role of shareholder activism during the 
Twentieth Century); Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and 
Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 75–82 (2011) 
(charting the rise of hedge fund shareholder activism starting with the 1980s 
through the present).  
 166. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 15–23 (2012) 
(tracing the rise of shareholder value ideology); William W. Bratton & Michael 
L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 
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the CEO of Apple recently suggested—in non-Revlon 
circumstances167—that the goal of the company was not to 
maximize the shareholders’ returns at the expense environmental 
considerations,168 the offhanded remarks roused a lively 
controversy169 and serious academic discussion over whether the 
CEO had breached his fiduciary duties to Apple’s shareholders.170 
                                                                                                     
653, 653 (2010) (arguing that “shareholder empowerment delivers management 
a simple and emphatic marching order: manage to maximize the market price of 
the stock”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 1465, 1510–35 (2007) (charting “the shift toward shareholder value as the 
ultimate corporate objective” from 1950–2005); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) 
(“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law 
should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).  
 167. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering 
Revlon scrutiny). 
 168. At the 2014 annual shareholder meeting of Apple, its CEO, Tim Cook, 
responded to a shareholder question regarding Apple’s efforts to battle climate 
change, by saying: 
We do things because they are right and just and that is who we are. 
That’s who we are as a company. . . . [W]hen I think about human 
rights, I don’t think about an ROI [return on investment]. When I 
think about making our products accessible for the people that can’t 
see or to help a kid with autism, I don’t think about a bloody ROI, 
and by the same token, I don’t think about helping our environment 
from an ROI point of view. . . . If you only want me to make things, 
make decisions that have a clear ROI, then you should get out of the 
stock. 
Chris Taylor, Tim Cook to Climate Skeptic Group: Get Out of Apple Stock, 
MASHABLE (Feb. 28, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/02/28/apple-ceo-tim-cook-
climate-change/#:eyJzIjoidCIsImkiOiJfcjU4dDJ4bXA3emdwbHpjaSJ9 (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 169. See Press Release, NAT’L CENTER FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. (Feb. 28, 2014), 
http://www.nationalcenter.org/PR-Apple_Tim_Cook_Climate_022814.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2014) (criticizing the CEO’s comments as essentially telling 
Apple’s investors to “Drop Dead”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 170. Compare Haskell Murray, Fiduciary Duties: Hobby Lobby, Conestoga 
Wood and Apple, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/03/fiduciary-duties-hobby-
lobby-conestoga-wood-and-apple.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (suggesting the 
comments implicated a potential breach of fiduciary duty) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review), with Stephen Bainbridge, Can Tim Cook 
Ignore ROI When Deciding How to Design an iPhone?, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/03/can-tim-
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Rather than dwindle, it seems that Revlon’s shareholder-focused 
fiduciary mandate has seeped beyond its specific transactional 
boundaries and found its way into every corporate decision.171 In 
thirty years, it has evolved from a narrow legal doctrine to an 
unquestioned norm that frames virtually all boardroom 
discussions.172 If this theory is correct, then it should be no 
surprise that courts seldom enjoin transactions or award 
damages for breach of Revlon duties, despite the uptick in volume 
of shareholder litigation. Courts may simply be finding few cases 
in which boards did not act in good faith to maximize the wealth 
of their shareholders.  
There is some evidence to corroborate this theory. Johnson 
and Ricca note—in support of their claim that Revlon offers little 
remedial clout—that from 2008 through December 2013, the 
Delaware Chancery Court granted an injunction in only one of 
fifteen reported decisions.173 But a closer look at those fourteen 
decisions in which the court did not grant an injunction reveals 
the reason in the vast majority of cases—eleven of fourteen—was 
because the plaintiffs had not established a reasonable likelihood 
of success on the merits of their claim.174 Put differently, based on 
a preliminary record, in all but four of the fifteen cases that the 
coauthors cite the court determined the defendant-directors had 
been faithful to their Revlon duty to maximize the value paid to 
                                                                                                     
cook-ignore-roi-when-deciding-how-to-design-an-iphone.html (last visited Oct. 3, 
2014) (arguing that the position espoused by Apple’s CEO is protected by the 
business judgment rule) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 171. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. 
Ch. 2010) (Chandler, C.) (ruling outside of the Revlon context that “Directors of 
a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a rights plan to defend a 
business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization—at 
least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties”); see also Johnson & 
Ricca, supra note 11, at 219 (arguing that “the immediate share price 
maximization norm may not be so easily cabined within the sale of company 
context”). In other scholarship, Professor Johnson has cogently critiqued this 
seepage of shareholder value maximization into broader corporate law. See 
Lyman Johnson, The Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business 
Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 432–50 (2013).  
 172. Indeed, beyond a mere norm, Professor David Yosifon has argued that 
the obligation to maximize shareholder wealth is unambiguously corporate law. 
See generally David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY 
BUS. L. J. 181 (2014). 
 173. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 212, 226–27. 
 174. See infra Appendix. 
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their shareholders.175 Although telling, this finding says nothing, 
of course, of the countless Revlon claims dismissed as meritless 
by the Delaware Chancery Court in bench rulings without a 
written opinion.176  
Thus, the bulk of Revlon’s importance appears to be what 
Johnson and Ricca recognize as its “prophylactic effect” on board 
decisions.177 If so, then Revlon’s significance as a corporate law 
doctrine should be measured not by the remedies courts grant ex 
post but by the doctrine’s impact ex ante on corporate culture and 
boardroom discussions.178 For directors, legal liability is likely an 
afterthought; they instead are preoccupied with “the 
maximization of shareholder profit.”179 Thus, courts seldom 
enforce Revlon, not because it is a “nonenforceable norm or mere 
aspirational standard,”180 but because the norm of shareholder 
value maximization is today so deeply enmeshed into corporate 
boardrooms that it seldom needs judicial enforcement. 
Of course, even if Revlon enjoys pervasive salience in 
corporate culture and practice, future developments in corporate 
law may yet dwindle its continuing endurance as an enforceable 
legal doctrine. For example, Vice Chancellor Laster has recently 
                                                                                                     
 175. To be sure, the fact that plaintiffs in eleven of these fourteen reported 
cases were unable to show a reasonable likelihood of success could be 
interpreted to support Johnson and Ricca’s claim that Revlon is today a largely 
unenforceable legal doctrine. But the more recent cases, like Chen and Rural 
Metro, belie this reasoning. Moreover, as noted above, even in those cases where 
the chancery court found the plaintiffs’ Revlon claim stood a reasonable 
likelihood of success on the merits but nonetheless denied a preliminary 
injunction to block the challenged transaction, significant settlements followed. 
See supra note 147. Such settlements indicate that the Revlon claims made in 
those cases bore some real risk of monetary liability and were settled solely for 
nuisance value. 
 176. See Edward M. McNally, The Court of Chancery Speaks by Transcript, 
MORRIS JAMES (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.morrisjames.com/newsroom-articles-
12.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (discussing the proliferations of transcript 
opinions reflecting the bench rulings of the Delaware Chancery Court) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 177. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 216. 
 178. See id. at 215–16 (noting that “an ex ante frame of reference . . . sheds 
light on [Revlon’s] enduring, if more modest, value in today’s M&A practice and 
law”). 
 179. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 176, 
185 (Del. 1995). 
 180. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 217. 
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floated in dictum the idea that an informed shareholder vote 
would reduce the judicial scrutiny in a Revlon transaction from 
objective reasonableness to business judgment rule deference.181 
Such a move would arguably be consistent with recent doctrinal 
developments in the corporate law governing controlling 
shareholder cash-out mergers182 and would limit the reach of 
Revlon’s enhanced scrutiny. Moreover, following the Rural Metro 
decision, there has been speculation that the Delaware 
legislature might amend DGCL § 102(b)(7), broadening its 
protective shield to cover corporate actors other than directors.183 
Exculpating officers like directors, for instance, would eliminate 
any lingering possibility of personal liability for breaches of the 
fiduciary duty of care in the Revlon context,184 although it would 
presumably do nothing to protect improperly motivated 
fiduciaries acting in bad faith from monetary damages;185 nor 
would it prevent courts from granting injunctions, rather than 
monetary damages, to block deals struck in connection with a 
Revlon violation.186 But even if these or other subsequent 
                                                                                                     
 181. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 669 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(Laster, V.C.) (“[W]hat could affect the standard of review of a sale process 
challenge (at least in my view) would be a fully informed, non-coerced 
stockholder vote.”); In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 84 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(“[T]his case does not provide any opportunity to consider whether a fully 
informed stockholder vote would lower the standard of review from enhanced 
scrutiny to the business judgment rule.”). 
 182. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) 
(holding that where a controlling shareholder cash out merger is, among other 
things, approved by an “uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority 
stockholders” the reviewing court will apply business judgment rule deference 
rather than entire fairness). 
 183. See C. Steven Bradford, Will Delaware Plug the 102(b)(7) Hole?, BUS. L. 
PROF BLOG (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/04/will-delaware-plug-the-
102b7-hole.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (discussing the options the Delaware 
legislature has to address the liability non-director corporate actors face under 
the current version of DGCL § 102(b)(7)) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 184. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text (explaining that 
exculpation protects directors, but not officers, from personal liability for 
breaches of the fiduciary duty of care). 
 185. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that exculpation under DGCL 
102(b)(7) does not apply to situations where directors act in bad faith). 
 186. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining that exculpation 
under DGCL 102(b)(7) applies only to monetary damages and does not limit the 
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developments do effectively limit the impact of Revlon as an 
enforceable legal directive, the corporate ethos articulated by 
Revlon—the sacred altar of shareholder value—will subsist in 
corporate practice. 
B. The Rise of Alternative Entities and Benefit Corporations  
If Revlon is dwindling, as suggested above, it is not from 
within the confines of corporate law and practice. If it is 
dwindling, it is from outside the pressed edges of corporate law, 
where other bodies of business law have emerged rejecting Revlon 
as a fiduciary mandate.  
For example, in recent years the use and popularity of LLCs 
and other unincorporated alternative entity forms has 
proliferated,187 especially in Delaware.188 Yet, under Delaware 
alternative entity law, the fiduciary duties of business managers 
are optional; they are merely default duties that can be modified 
or wholly eliminated by the terms of an entity’s governing 
agreement.189 As I have shown in previous scholarship, 
                                                                                                     
ability of plaintiffs to seek equitable remedies such as an injunction). 
 187. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An 
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LLPs Formed 
in the United States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax 
Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 468–78 (2010) (reporting 
empirical data confirming the ascent of the LLC as the dominant business form 
in the United States). 
 188. See Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory 
of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 201–02 (2011) 
(“During the five-year period ending in 2009, the number of new Delaware LLCs 
outpaced corporations anywhere from 256% to 313%. To put these numbers in 
perspective, consider that in 2007 alone, an average of 430 LLCs were formed on 
each weekday in Delaware.”); Peter J. Walsh, Jr & Dominick T. Gattuso, 
Delaware LLCs: The Wave of the Future and Advising Your Clients About What 
to Expect, A.B.A. BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 11 (“In less than two 
decades, Delaware limited liability companies (LLC) have gone from nouveau 
‘alternative’ entity to the ‘go-to’ entity.”). 
 189. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2013) (governing limited 
partnerships); id. § 18-1101(c) (governing LLCs); see also Mohsen Manesh, 
Contractual Freedom under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from 
Publically Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 560–62 (2012) (describing 
the default status of fiduciary duties under Delaware alternative entity law); 
Manesh, supra note 188, at 225–26 (describing the contractual nature of LLCs 
under Delaware law).  
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businesses adopting the alternative entity form are able to easily 
mimic the corporate form and even successfully access the capital 
of public markets.190 Yet, the standard practice among publicly 
traded alternative entity businesses is to eliminate the fiduciary 
duties of managers, replacing them with less onerous contractual 
obligations.191 By rejecting the fiduciary framework of corporate 
law, publicly traded alternative entities have also rejected 
Revlon’s legal mandate.192 But it is not because these firms have 
also rejected Revlon’s normative tenet. Rather, investors in these 
unincorporated businesses, it seems, have willingly traded the 
judicially enforced obligation of shareholder wealth maximization 
in favor of market-driven constraints on their managers in order 
to maximize the returns of their investments.193  
At the other end of the spectrum, the rise of benefit 
corporation statutes signals yet another breach in Revlon’s 
hegemony over business practice. Today, approximately twenty-
six states have adopted some form of benefit corporation 
                                                                                                     
 190. See generally Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of 
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465 (2009) (describing the multi-million 
dollar initial public offerings of two Delaware limited partnerships and a 
Delaware LLC). 
 191. See Manesh, supra note 189, at 574–75 (reporting empirical evidence 
showing that 88% of publicly traded alternative entity firms fully eliminate or 
exculpate the fiduciary duties of their managers). 
 192. Although Delaware LLCs and limited partnership may in the terms of 
their governing agreements eliminate their managers’ fiduciary duties, such 
firms cannot eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2013) (governing limited 
partnerships); id. § 18-1101(c) (governing LLCs). Still, the Delaware Chancery 
Court has made clear that “the implied covenant cannot be invoked to override 
the express provisions of a contract” to impose a Revlon-like duty. See Lonergan 
v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1016–21 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding that the 
implied covenant cannot impose an obligation to pursue an “adequate and fair 
sale process” that is “[r]eminscent of Revlon” where the governing agreement 
expressly permits a sale by an alternative “special approval” process).  
 193. Cf. Manesh, supra note 189, at 597 (“[E]ven in the absence of 
meaningful contractual constraints, . . . other market-based mechanisms [may] 
efficiently guard against publicly traded alternative entity agency costs.”). See 
generally LARRY RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 193–222 (2010); 
Suren Gomtsian, The Governance of Publicly Traded Limited Liability 
Companies 26 (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2014-008) (Feb. 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2391621 (discussing the role 
of market constraints on the governance of LLCs). 
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legislation (or some variant thereof),194 including most notably 
Delaware, which adopted its statute in 2013.195 While these 
statutes vary somewhat across jurisdictions, all share a common 
core: the rejection of Revlon’s basic precept that a business is run 
solely to advance the financial interests of shareholders.196  
The proliferation of these statutes can be explained by the 
misperception that traditional corporations and their directors 
have a legal duty to ruthlessly maximize the wealth of their 
shareholders under all circumstances.197 Ironically, this 
misperception stems, in part, from the pervasive reach of Revlon 
and its seepage into every facet of corporate decision-making. In 
reality, beyond Revlon’s narrow scope—covering only “sale or 
change in control” transactions198—the business judgment rule 
                                                                                                     
 194. See J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: 
Comparing the State Statutes (May 1, 2014), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556 (providing a chart of all fifty 
states corporate forms of social enterprise). Despite the proliferation of these 
statutes, it is admittedly a separate question how many businesses will actually 
opt in to these alternative corporate forms. 
 195. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–68. See generally J. Haskell Murray, 
Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2437001 (discussing 
Delaware’s divergence from the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation); Alicia 
Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting 
In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. (forthcoming 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377267 (discussing the impact of Delaware’s newly 
adopted statute that allows entities to incorporate as public benefit 
corporations). 
 196. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (“[A] public benefit corporation 
shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary 
interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s 
conduct, and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of 
incorporation.”). 
 197. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR 
THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE 
NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS AND ULTIMATELY THE PUBLIC 14 
(2012), www.benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Benecit_Corporation_White_ 
Paper_1_18_2013.pdf (“In the day-to-day context where the business judgment 
rule applies, a judge may not find it to be appropriate to consider and advance 
non-shareholder interests for their own sake (i.e., as part of the company’s 
mission) and not as a way of maximizing long-term shareholder financial 
value . . . .”). 
 198. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering 
Revlon scrutiny). 
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affords corporate directors ample discretion to make decisions 
that serve the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders.199 If 
directors myopically focus on the interests of shareholders, then it 
is not because corporate law requires it, but because shareholders 
demand it.200 
Putting aside the dubious need for benefit corporation 
legislation, however, the proliferation of these statues and, more 
generally, the rise of the larger social enterprise movement201 
represent yet another rejection of Revlon’s dictate, both as a legal 
mandate and as a normative tenet. Investors in these social 
enterprises, it seems, have willingly traded the judicially enforced 
obligation of shareholder wealth maximization in favor of an 
unenforceable aspiration to do well financially by doing good in 
business. 
Johnson and Ricca wonder whether the rise of benefit 
corporations may cause the Delaware courts to revisit the Revlon 
mandate.202 But consider the possibility that social enterprise 
legislation may do the opposite. The very existence of an 
alternative legal regime rejecting the primacy of shareholders 
may serve as a counterpoint for corporate law, ossifying the 
already pervasive norm within traditional, for-profit corporations 
that boards must mercilessly pursue shareholder wealth 
maximization under all circumstances. If so, then benefit 
corporations may, ironically, bolster Revlon’s status within 
                                                                                                     
 199. See STOUT, supra note 166, at 24–31; cf. Yosifon, supra note 172, at 
(conceding that although corporate law dictates shareholder primacy, the 
business judgment rule gives directors “near total discretion” and, therefore, “it 
is nearly impossible to enforce the shareholder primacy norm”); accord 
Bainbridge, supra note 170 (“[C]urrent law allows boards of directors 
substantial discretion to consider the impact of their decisions on interests other 
than shareholder wealth maximization.”). 
 200. Cf. Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in 
Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1038 (2013) (“The problem that 
[benefit corporation statutes are] seeking to address . . . may not [be] a problem 
of law, but one of business strategy . . . . [T]he answer to creating more socially 
responsible corporations may lie in the classrooms of business schools and not in 
the halls of state legislatures.”). 
 201. See generally Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the 
New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351 (2011); Robert 
A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59 (2010). 
 202. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 223–24. 
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corporate law and practice, even while rejecting the doctrine’s 
central dictate.  
IV. Conclusion 
Nearing thirty years in age, Revlon endures today as an 
enforceable legal obligation. Indeed, recent chancery court 
decisions demonstrate Revlon’s extensive grasp, reaching 
corporate directors, officers, and even corporate advisors—all to 
ensure that in a “sale or change in control” transaction,203 
shareholders “get[] the best price” reasonably available for their 
investment.204 Given the doctrine’s continuing vigor, it is 
unsurprising then that questions about Revlon’s purpose and 
triggers, its contours and boundaries, continue to garner close 
academic and practitioner interest.205  
Taking a remedial perspective on the doctrine, Johnson and 
Ricca are able to coherently harmonize Revlon’s evolution with 
subsequent developments in corporate law more broadly. And in 
the process, the coauthors have liberated Revlon from the 
“narrow, silo-like doctrinal isolation”206 that it is too often 
accorded. For these significant scholarly contributions the pair 
should be commended. 
But what the coauthors perceive to be the dwindling of 
Revlon as an enforceable legal directive may actually reflect the 
hegemony of the doctrine’s unitary shareholder focus in corporate 
culture and boardroom discussions. If Revlon is dwindling, it is 
happening from outside of corporate law, where competing bodies 
of law have emerged, rejecting or dispensing of the doctrine’s 
fiduciary mandate. Viewed from this broader perspective, the 
dwindling of Revlon may simply be a part of a larger narrative: 
the dwindling of the corporate form as the only way to do 
business.207  
                                                                                                     
 203. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering 
Revlon scrutiny). 
 204. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 176, 182 
(Del. 1995).  
 205. See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 172. 
 207. Cf. Manesh, supra note 190 (describing the competitive threat that LLC 
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and limited partnership law represents to the continuing vitality of the 
corporate form). 
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